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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Drafting of the annual government budget suscite lively debates both in parliament and 
the public at large. The reason is that shifts in fiscal policy have considerable implications 
for the allocation of public goods, the redistribution of resources between different groups 
and the stabilisation of the aggregate economy. There are also widely different opinions 
about fiscal policy in the economics profession. There are few definite conclusions on the 
economic effects of changes in fiscal policy. Different theoretical models not only predict a 
different persistence or magnitude, but also result in a different sign of the economic 
responses.1 Empirical evidence does not provide unanimous results either. The lack of an 
empirical consensus owes to the problems in the identification of exogenous shifts in fiscal 
policy. There are basically four empirical problems with fiscal VARs. First, the government 
has available plenty of different fiscal instruments. The aggregation of the scattered use of 
many spending and tax tools in a summary fiscal shock mutes the economic responses. 
Second, the public can easily anticipate policy changes because of the long time lags 
between the announcement and the implementation of fiscal packages. This makes it 
hard to pin down the exact timing of a fiscal shock. Third, fiscal variables move with the 
economic cycle, mainly due to automatic stabilisers. Finally, fiscal policy is subject to a 
budget constraint. Hence, in addition to the response of spending or taxes to economic 
variables (output, interest rates, inflation) there is a feedback effect of public debt. 
Spending will need to be cut or taxes raised if the government is to keep public debt under 
control. 
 
The reason for the widely different empirical effects of fiscal policy mainly owe to different 
assumptions in the identification of the fiscal shocks. Empirical fiscal SVAR studies have 
typically ignored public debt. This can have quite dire consequences, especially in models 
that incorporate forward-looking economic behaviour (Christ, 1979; Sims, 1998). 
Constraints that are believed to work out in the long-term also have their repercussions for 
expected adjustments in fiscal policy in the short-term. These may overturn the perceived 
wisdom about the economic effects of fiscal policy (Gordon and Leeper, 2005). In this 
paper, I propose to directly incorporate the budget constraint in the empirical model. The 
structural vector error correction model captures the long-term relationship between 
                                                 
1 See Perotti (2007) for a comparison of the different theoretical models, and their empirical predictions. 
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spending and revenues: shocks to this equilibrium and the ensuing adjustment are 
responsible for short-term fluctuations around some common trends, which are driven by 
the shocks with permanent effects. This approach has two benefits. First, the budget 
constraint implies some identifying restrictions on the behaviour of fiscal policy that are 
directly taken from theory. I.e., the fiscal adjustment on the spending or revenue side to 
keep the budget in balance over time are directly incorporated in the VAR. Second, I take 
an explicitly intertemporal view on the response of economic agents to the changes in 
fiscal policy. 
 
I apply the common trends model on US quarterly data since 1965. The main finding is the 
contractionary effect on output and inflation of fiscal expansions in the short run. This is 
consistent with a Real Business Cycle model of fiscal policy that displays period-by-period 
budget balance, with distortionary taxation. The results can alternatively be read as a 
negative Ricardian effect of fiscal policy due to expectations of fiscal adjustments by future 
tax rises or spending cuts that restore fiscal sustainability (Gordon and Leeper, 2005). 
Policy interaction might give an additional argument for reversing the usual crowding in 
effects of fiscal policy (Linnemann and Schabert, 2003). I indeed find a contractionary 
response of the Federal Reserve to fiscal expansions of the Treasury. The slight 
contraction of moneary policy is unlikely to explain the large size of the output contraction, 
however. Conversely, monetary policy shocks do not elicit a direct fiscal response. I also 
find government spending to have substantial supply-side effects in the long term. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I review the findings of the fiscal VAR 
literature in the light of the sustainability of public debt. This implies also a discussion of 
the interaction of fiscal variables with monetary policy. The econometric set up of this 
common trends model, its identification and the interpretation of the structural shocks are 
detailed in section 3. I then analyse the effects of fiscal policy in section 4. I conclude in 
section 5 and offer some suggestions for further research. 
 
2. THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY, AND PUBLIC DEBT 
 
Ricardian Equivalence is a reasonable starting point for the theoretical analysis of the 
effects of fiscal policy (Barro, 1974). Few economists would endorse it as a realistic 
description of fiscal policy, however. The view that private savings fully offset the change 
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in public savings is not based on a firm empirical rejection of Ricardian Equivalence, for 
this hypothesis is not directly testable. Many empirical studies have therefore examined 
the alternative hypothesis as to whether fiscal policy has any real economic effects. 
Results widely differ in the size and sign of the effects of government spending and taxes, 
but all studies would agree that the financing decisions of government are not neutral for 
the real economy. Although public debt is crucial to the Ricardian model, fiscal VARs have 
typically not paid much attention to the government budget constraint.  
 
The period-by-period dynamics of total debt bt  are given by the accumulation of interest 
payments on past fiscal imbalances and the current primary surplus st , which is the 
difference of government revenues t t  and government spending gt . 
 .      where          )1( 1 ttttttt gtssbrb −=−+≡ −     (1) 
Solving forward (1), one obtains the intertemporal budget constraint IGBC (2). 
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The sustainability condition is met when the public sector does not leave any public assets 
or liabilities with positive probability. For this to hold, the transversality condition needs to 
be satisfied, i.e. when  
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Some equivalent tests for fiscal sustainability can then be derived under various 
assumptions on this condition. Cointegration between non-stationary government 
expenditures gt  and revenues t t  can be shown – under some weak economic 
assumptions – to be a necessary condition for the IGBC to hold. Conversely, this 
cointegration relation is also a sufficient condition under weak assumptions on the DGP of 
debt, viz. that it is an I(1) process (Ahmed and Rogers, 1995). It then follows that the total 
government deficit series is stationary when spending and revenues are cointegrated.2 
Alternatively, cointegration between the primary surplus st and public debt bt also implies 
that public debt is sustainable. This relation can also be rewritten in terms of a reaction 
function (4): 
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 ttt bs μρ +=         (4) 
Bohn (1998) proofs that a strictly positive reaction of the primary surplus to public debt in 
this ‘fiscal rule’ is a robust sufficient condition for the sustainability of public finances. Most 
of the empirical tests of fiscal sustainability have been based on the (co)integration 
implications of the transversality condition, or on tests of fiscal rules. 
 
The analysis of public debt in fiscal VARs has commonly been limited to an analysis of the 
joint VAR process of surplus and debt. Roberds (1991) and Carriero et al. (2005) develop 
a test of fiscal sustainability based on the violation of the cross-equation coefficient 
restrictions that the IGBC imposes on the joint DGP of debt and surplus (Hansen et al., 
1991). Other studies develop a test for the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. According to 
this theory, the IGBC is not a constraint but rather a value equation. If the government fails 
to take actions to ensure its budget constraint is satisfied, equilibria are possible where 
fiscal – rather than monetary – policy determines the price level (Leeper, 1991; Sims, 
1994). The possibility of such a non-Ricardian regime arises as government solvency 
eventually has to be ensured in real terms. If fiscal policy is sufficiently reactive to debt, 
however, then the IGBC will be satisfied for all price paths. Monetary policy retains the 
ability to control prices in this Ricardian environment. Canzoneri et al. (2001) distinguish 
Ricardian from non-Ricardian regimes in fiscal policy by examining the sign of serial 
correlations in deficits following shocks to debt in a bivariate VAR.3 
 
In contrast, VAR studies that are interested in the economic effects of fiscal policy have 
typically ignored the path of public debt. This has two serious consequences (Sims, 1998; 
Favero and Giavazzi, 2007). First, the VAR coefficients are typically biased. The economic 
shocks that have been identified as structural still include a response to the future changes 
in spending and taxation that are needed to keep the level of the public debt in check.4 
Second, due to this bias, the interpretation of the results of usual fiscal VARs in terms of a 
corresponding DSGE model could be invalid. The paths of government spending and 
taxes may imply unstable dynamics for the public debt ratio. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Such ‘bounded’ sustainability implies that undiscounted public debt is finite in the long run. With an 
unspecified cointegrating vector, only ‘weak’ sustainability can be said to hold (Quintos, 1995). 
3 Sala (2004) finds evidence for different regimes in which the FTPL is relevant. He compares the responses to 
a tax shock in an extended FTPL-model with the impulse responses from a VAR. 
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Depending on the time path of financing, economic effects will wind out over shorter or 
longer periods, but as Ricardian Equivalence applies, all variables eventually return to 
steady state in the long term.5 The economic interpretation of fiscal policies that lead to 
maintaining sustainability over time has governments adjust spending or taxes (or both) so 
as not to let debt explode. I incorporate the long-term budget constraint in a standard fiscal 
VAR, and employ a structural vector error correction model to estimate the economic 
effects and the debt stabilising (error correction) changes in fiscal policy.6 I account for 
economic conditions by including output and inflation. A control for the endogenous 
reaction of interest rates is necessary, given the crucial role of monetary policy in the joint 
determination of sustainable fiscal plans. Omission of either fiscal or monetary policy 
when interaction matters may bias the findings of analysing fiscal or monetary policy in 
isolation.7,8 
 
3. THE SVAR-COMMON TRENDS ANALYSIS 
 
3.1. The common trends methodology 
 
A common trends model decomposes time series into trends and stationary variables. 
Denote by Xt  a vector of n  integrated time series, and decompose these series in some 
permanent trends XtP  and a stationary residual component XtT .  
.Tt
P
tt XXX +≡        (5) 
Neither component in (5) is observable as such. We can give content to the permanent 
and transitory components in the following way (Stock and Watson, 1988).9 There are 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Favero and Giavazzi (2007) show how including the stock of public debt produces coefficient estimates that 
are signficantly different from a usual SVAR. 
5 Public debt can be non-neutral in the short-term in DSGE models if government bonds serve transaction 
purposes (Schabert, 2004). 
6 Bohn (1991) considers spending cuts or tax increases in a VEC model that includes fiscal series only. 
7 Different theories of policy interaction highlight the role of interest rates and inflation for the path of public 
debt (Sims, 1998; Dixit and Lambertini, 2003). 
8 Time series tests for sustainability based on the transversality condition are not very informative about which 
fiscal policies are sustainable (Bohn, 2007). We need economic assumptions that imply more stringent bounds 
on the feasible path of fiscal variables, such that the usual necessity conditions for cointegration apply. 
Embedding the budget constraint in an economic model is an example of an ‘economic’ test of fiscal 
sustainability. 
9 King et al. (1991) apply the common trends model to analyse the long and short-term properties of economic 
growth in the US. Other applications are in the monetary field (Bagliano et al., 2002; Englund et al., 1994; 
Jacobson et al., 2002) or in the transmission of shocks in open economies (Villani and Warne, 2003; Corsetti 
and Konstantinou, 2005). 
  
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2007                                     Working Papers 2007/15, 45 pages 
7
stochastic trends underlying the data series that are drive by some shocks with persistent 
effects. As there are usually fewer of these trends than variables in the model, the steady 
state relationships determine some stationary fluctuations around the stochastic trends. In 
formal notation, the existence of r  cointegrating relationships between the n  variables in 
Xt  allows us to extract the permanent components, which are driven by rnk −≡  
common stochastic trends. The stationary fluctuations around these trends are given by 
the r  cointegrating relationships. The permanent shocks do not only determine the 
long-term properties of the series, but can have transitory effects as well.  
 
An equivalent way to write Xt  then is (6) 
),,0(                   )(0 ntttt IWNLFXX ≈Φ++= νντ     (6) 
where (a) )(λΦ  is assumed finite for all λ  in and on the unit circle; (b) X 0  is stationary; 
and (c) tν  is white noise. The trend component is then described by tFτ  , where F  is the 
loading matrix of dimension kn×  and rank k  on the permanent components. The trend 
tτ  is a random walk with drift μ  and innovation tϕ  (7): 
).,0(                              1 ktttt IWN≈++= − ϕϕτμτ     (7) 
The common trends model then decomposes the time series Xt , as in (8):  
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When the number of k  common trends is less than the number n  of variables, there are 
exactly knr −=  linearly independent cointegrating vectors. Let these vectors be 
collected in ?. As these are orthogonal to the loading matrix F  , the process tXβ ′  is 
jointly stationary. 
 
In particular, when Xt  is generated by a VAR with lag length p as in (9)  
),,0(                        )( Σ≈+= WNXLA ttt εερ      (9) 
and if Xt  is cointegrated of order (1,1) with r  cointegrating vectors, then we know from the 
Granger Representation Theorem that rArank =)]1([  and βα ′=)1(A , with α  the 
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loading matrix of adjustment coefficients on the r  cointegrating vectors. Equation (9) can 
then be rewritten as a VECM (10): 
. , )(ith          w          )(
1
1
1
1 AjAAIAXXLA
p
ij
iii
p
i
nttt +=
∗∗−
=
∗
−
∗ ∑−=∑−=+′−=Δ λλεβαρ   (10) 
If we rule out orders of integration larger than unity, there also exists a Wold VMA 
representation of (10) as in (11)  
,)( tt LCX εδ +=Δ        (11) 
This can be rewritten as a common trends model similar to (8), if we let 
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This is nothing else than the Beverdige-Nelson decomposition of Xt . In (12), )1(C  has 
reduced rank k  under the assumption of r  cointegrating vectors. I.e., only k  elements of 
tC ε)1(  result in independent permanent effects on Xt . As the loading matrix F  is not 
orthogonal to the elements of tC ε)1( , permanent shocks also have transitory effects on 
Xt . In contrast, transitory shocks have an effect on the temporary component only. Hence, 
short-term dynamics are determined by all innovations in the system. Warne (1993) 
derived a general estimation strategy of the common trends model based on (10) and the 
Wold VMA representation as in (11).10 
 
Identification of the permanent and transitory shocks requires some assumptions on the 
long-term behaviour of the model. Call Γ  any regular matrix of dimension n  such that 
Γ′ΓΣ  is diagonal. Then )1(R  1)1( −Γ≡ C  is the total impact matrix to innovations in the 
long term. Let ti,η  be the i-th component of the vector tεΓ  . The matrix Γ  is said to 
                                                 
10 Warne (1993) moreover derives the asymptotic impulse response functions under the hypothesis of a 
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identify the common trends model if: (a) Γ  is uniquely determined from the parameters in 
(10); (b) the covariance matrix of tεΓ  is diagonal with non-zero diagonal elements; and (c) 
the total impact matrix [)1( =R  F  M  0  ]  . The innovation is categorised as transitory 
(permanent) if column },...,1{ ni∈  of )1(R  is (non-)zero. Permanent innovations are thus 
associated to the k  common trends in F . Hence, the reduced form VMA representation 
in expression (11) is equivalent to the structural model (13)  
,)( tt LRX ηδ +=Δ        (13) 
where tη  contains the serially uncorrelated structural disturbances with mean zero and 
with covariance matrix In . This then allows retrieving the permanent and transitory 
component of each series in Xt . 
 
In practice, after establishing the cointegrating rank r  we determine the cointegrating 
vectors β  . These may either be obtained via the usual ML estimation techniques or can 
be directly imposed from the steady state properties of some economic theory. This 
associates the cointegrating vectors to the r  transitory innovations and thus imposes 
rn×  identifying restrictions. In a second step, we calculate the matrix of common trend 
parameters using the orthogonality of the cointegrating vectors to the permanent 
components. Following King et al. (1991), we may write π0FF = , where 0F  is an kn×  
matrix chosen so as to have 00 =′Fβ . The latter restriction results in a further kr ×  
restrictions. However, these restrictions do not attribute any particular economic meaning 
to the k  trends. We therefore need kk ×  additional assumptions to isolate k  unique (and 
economically interpretable) trends. Assuming that the permanent shocks are uncorrelated 
and satisfy a (choleski) ordering on their reciprocal influence,11 gives us a further 2
)1( +kk  
restrictions. The choice of π  does not imply recursiveness for the total loading matrix F , 
as 0F  actually determines how the trends influence Xt . Finally, at least 2
)1( −kk  additional 
constraints on the effect of permanent shocks on the variables included in the model need 
be motivated by economic theory. Estimation then proceeds on the VECM (10). 
                                                                                                                                                 
known finite upper bound p on the lag order of the VAR. 
11That is, π  is lower triangular. 
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3.2. Specification and identification 
 
I specify a VAR in the (log) levels of real GDP )(y  , inflation )(p  , a short-term nominal 
interest rate )(i  and the (log) levels of real government expenditure )( tg  and revenues 
)( tt . The model for the DGP can be written in VECM form as follows, with m the number of 
lags: 
.
]      [    where
...111
′=
+Δ++Δ+′=Δ −∗−∗−
tgipyX
XAXAXX
t
tmtsttt εβα      (14) 
 
I assume three cointegration relations may be present in the DGP of Xt , each of which I 
associate with the temporary shocks in tη . With 5=n  variables and 3=k  cointegration 
relations, we thus specify 15 parameters in the cointegration vectors. A further six 
restrictions come from the orthogonality of the three cointegration vectors to the 2=r  
common trends. The choleski ordering of uncorrelated permanent shocks gives us three 
more restrictions. This leaves one further restriction to be imposed. In accordance with the 
literature, I interpret the two permanent components as a real and a nominal trend 
respectively (King et al., 1991). I distinguish both by assuming that the nominal trend has 
no long-term effect on real output. The real trend captures a technology shock with a 
permanent effect on real variables. The nominal trend instead captures any shock with 
long-term effect on nominal variables.12 This provides us with a decomposition of the 
series into permanent and transitory components that carry an economic interpretation 
within the model.13 
 
The fiscal ‘solvency’ shock ( tt tg − ) 
I impose the cointegration relation between government spending gt  and revenues t t  as 
a necessary and sufficient condition for the intertemporal government budget constraint to 
hold. The structural innovation to the budget constraint is our fiscal shock. I do not impose 
strong sustainability on the cointegrating relation between expenditures and revenues, but 
instead leave the cointegration coefficients unspecified. Also, I include interest payments 
                                                 
12 This models any longer term shifts in monetary policy. No effect of the nominal trend on either spending or 
taxes is assumed. 
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in government spending and thus implicitly impose a unity coefficient on this variable. 
 
This fiscal shock is not directly comparable to the ones commonly identified in fiscal VARs 
for various reasons. First, these studies examine the effect of unanticipated changes in 
discretionary policy, but disregard the ensuing adjustment in expenditures or revenues to 
maintain solvency. I.e., no attention is paid to the financing of the budget. It can be shown 
in basic RBC models that the effects of fiscal policy can be reversed depending on deficit 
or tax financing of budget expansions (Baxter and King, 1993). In my model, future fiscal 
adjustments constrain the short-term effects of current changes in fiscal policy.14 Consider 
a hike in public spending, for example. For a given level of tax revenues, this leads – 
ceteris paribus –  to a deficit and higher public debt. This requires a future rise in tax 
revenues (or a cut in spending). The anticipation of these offsetting policies has an impact 
on current economic variables, and these in turn determine the dynamic path of the fiscal 
variables. Second, the fiscal ‘solvency’ shock cannot be attributed to spending or 
revenues. The same example can be applied to a cut in taxes, for a given level of spending. 
I only identify deviations from the long-term budget balance. Finally, the fiscal shock is 
supposed to have no long-term effect on other variables. This is consistent with standard 
theories of fiscal policy and public debt where all variables eventually return to steady 
state. In practice, both government spending and taxation can have permanent long-term 
economic effects. In my model, these effects work out via the common trends and affect 
the dynamic path of the economy. For example, if the hike in public spending falls on 
(productive) government investment, this would likely boost long-term economic growth. 
Stronger potential growth enlarges tax bases and thus boosts revenues in the long term. 
This makes consolidation of public debt feasible without strong adjustments – and hence 
modifies future responses –in taxes or spending. 
 
The business cycle shock )( tt ty θ+  
some of the variation in the budget owes to endogenous cyclical variations in the 
short-term, mainly due to automatic stabilisers. Revenues are adjusted to finance public 
spending, but fluctuate because of short-term variations in the economy. The underlying 
assumption is that government spending absorbs a determinate share of output; I take 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 These components can be directly compared to statistical measures of potential output, cyclically adjusted 
government balances, core inflation and base real interest rates. 
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account of secular growth in the government sector with a real trend. I contribute the 
co-movement of government revenues and real output to business cycle shocks. This 
allows identifying temporary economic shocks.15 In contrast to Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002), I remove the cyclical fluctuations in fiscal policy from a real trend that is directly 
derived within the model as a permanent component. 
 
The monetary shock: Fisher relation ( pi − ) 
nominal interest rates and inflation are cointegrated. I may identify the relationship 
between interest rates and inflation either as a short-term Taylor or a long-term Fisher 
relation (Benhabib et al., 2001). I argue that we can identify a short-term shock to the real 
interest rate as a monetary policy shock. Sufficient variation in economic variables – other 
than inflation – is necessary for this interpretation. Unlike a bivariate relation between 
interest and inflation, I have sufficient restrictions in the other parts of the common trends 
model to identify the monetary shock. The real rate is not a constant: the real common 
trend, which reflects changes in productivity, shifts the natural rate of interest. The nominal 
trend models any longer term trends in monetary policy (Vlaar, 2004). Transitory business 
cycle shocks have been taken out. 
 
3.3. Some caveats on the common trends model 
 
The incorporation of the budget constraint in the VAR allows tracking the adjustment of 
spending and taxes after an initial fiscal shock. I control also for cyclical variation of the 
budget variables. But there are two other identification problems that fiscal VARs need to 
tackle. Foremost, how do we handle the anticipation effects of fiscal policy? There are long 
time lags between the announcement, the lengthy and visible budget negotiations and the 
implementation of a fiscal package. As fiscal shocks need not affect fiscal variables first, 
the shock can be non-fundamental (Lippi and Reichlin, 1994). The common trends model 
has some advantages in this regard. The long-term restrictions do not restrict 
contemporaneous links and should therefore catch anticipation effects.16 I characterise 
both the long-term growth and business cycle features of a variety of macroeconomic 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Blanchard and Perotti (2002) note that cointegration does not affect their findings for spending and tax 
shocks, but do not attempt to identify the cointegration relation. 
15 Given the identification of an aggregate supply shocks with one common trend, temporary shocks might be 
labelled as aggregate demand shocks. 
16 In particular if price variables are added to the system. 
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models in which the effects of fiscal policy are derived subject to the government budget 
constraint. A large number of identifying restrictions are thus consistent with the steady 
state properties of these models. I do not need to draw upon ad hoc assumptions. 
 
Long-term restrictions come at a cost though (Sarte, 1999). Even in large samples, 
substantial uncertainty surrounds the estimates of the long-term inverted MA 
representation in (11). Hence, we cannot construct asymptotically correct confidence 
intervals on )1(C  (Faust and Leeper, 1997). Specifying a priori the lag length of the VAR, 
or choosing the horizon at which the long run effect nullifies can solve this problem. I do 
not test the robustness of the long-term restriction of the nominal trend on output. As this 
seems a very robust restriction anyway – as King and Watson (1997) demonstrate – 
inferential problems may be minimal. How realistic is it to test the implication of the IGBC 
that spending and taxes are cointegrated? After all, there may simply not be enough 
memory in the DGP of fiscal data to infer upon a transversality condition that holds at 
infinite horizons (Canzoneri et al., 2001). Even assuming ergodicity of the DGP underlying 
fiscal variables, in-sample identification is only indicative: a rejection of sustainability 
would be consistent with either unsound fiscal management or with a data set that is 
insufficient for identification. Unit root and cointegration tests have well known small 
sample bias.17 
 
There is a potentially greater problem with the linear aggregation of budget data in total 
spending and taxes. I extract a limited number of shocks from the possibly large set of 
underlying shocks. Only if each shock affects the economy in qualitatively the same way 
will the shocks not be commingled. Different budget variables may have very diverse – 
perhaps even non-linear – effects (Giavazzi et al., 2000). I am interested only in the effect 
of deviations from budget balance. Nonetheless, I perform stability tests on both the 
VAR-coefficients and the cointegration tests to detect structural breaks. 
 
4. ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY 
4.1. Data 
 
                                                 
17 The omission of cointegration in fiscal VARs is usually justified by the fact that standard asymptotic tests 
remain valid in the presence of unit roots (Sims et al., 1990). 
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All data series for US fiscal and monetary policy are on a quarterly basis. The intermediate 
choice of data frequency reflects a trade-off in the joint modelling of fiscal and monetary 
policy. The budget law is commonly drafted every parliamentary year. Discretionary 
in-year revisions are not unusual, and cyclical responses are automatic. Whereas the 
latter effect mainly influences government revenues, the former mainly involves 
modiifications to spending (Van den Noord, 2002). In contrast, the central bank decides 
more regularly on interest rate revisions. Given a high degree of interest rate smoothing, 
the quarterly measure is probably not too coarse. 
Essential to the identification procedure is the construction of the fiscal series (Figure 1). 
All cyclically sensitive budget items are collected in government revenues. As in 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), tax revenues are net of government transfers. On the other 
hand, capital expenditure – which is mainly related to interest payments on outstanding 
debt – is added to government consumption. The monetary policy instrument is the 
Federal Funds rate. This rate became the tool for monetary policy actions since 1965, and 
is also the start of the data sample. I choose the GDP deflator for the inflation rate. Total 
output is net of government spending. All data are deflated by GDP and in log levels; 
inflation and nominal interest rates are in percentages.18 
 
4.2. Preliminary analysis 
 
Prior to the estimation and the dynamic analysis of the common trends model, we need to 
establish the following results: 
 
Unit root properties of the data series (Table 1) 
I find that all series in Xt  can be considered as non-stationary. Government spending and 
interest rates are level stationary according to the ADF test, but the KPSS test suggests 
that spending is an I(2) process. A similar finding results from a test for trend stationarity. 
In that case, output or government revenues might be trend stationary, however. Some 
classical tests of sustainability check for a unit root in public debt. Sustainability does not 
seem to be guaranteed in-sample. Debt is rather characterised as an I(2) series. Net or 
total interest payments follow this derailing of public finances, and also reflect an I(2) 
process. 
                                                 
18 Fiscal and GDP data are from the BEA (NIPA tables), public debt from the FRED II database, deflators from 
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Cointegrating rank of VAR (Table 2)  
I include a constant in the long-term part of the model. As a consequence, public debt 
converges to a bounded value in the long-term. For the real interest rate, I include a drift so 
as to allow a linear trend over time. Alternatively, I include a trend in the short-term part of 
the model next to the constant term in the cointegration part. Both models give nearly 
identical results. At a 5% significance level, the trace test favours a cointegrating rank of 3. 
When a trend is included, this hypothesis is accepted at the 10% level. Instead, the 
Saikkonen and Lütkepohl test (S&L) finds evidence for only 2 cointegrating relations. 
 
Estimation of the cointegrating vectors β  
the three cointegrating relations were estimated in the VECM (10) via maximum likelihood. 
A priori, four lags are included in the VAR. No seasonal dummies are included. The 
cointegration coefficient estimates are used as input for the common trends model.  
 
Imposition of the long-term restrictions 
identification of the permanent innovations requires the imposition of parameter values on 
the common trend parameters in 0F . In order to identify the real trend in F , I take the 
permanent (supply) shock on real output to result in a corresponding long-term increase in 
spending. The coefficient then θˆ  refers to this estimated long run equilibrium coefficient 
between yt  and gt . From cointegration between spending and revenues follows the 
relation between permanent output and revenues ( θˆ− ). Similarly, the nominal trend is 
assumed to affect both spending and revenues. The coefficients Gωˆ  and Tωˆ  are obtained 
from a regression of gt  and t t  on inflation respectively. 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=′
TG
F ωω
θθ
ˆˆ110
ˆˆ001
0        (15) 
After these initial steps, I estimate the common trends model, compute the Wold VMA 
representation and calculate the impulse responses and forecast error variance 
decomposition – and their respective asymptotic standard errors.19 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
BLS and the Federal Funds rate from the Federal Reserve. 
19 We plot the impulse responses over 20 periods, with their 66% asymptotic confidence bounds. 
  
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2007                                     Working Papers 2007/15, 45 pages 
16
4.3. Results 
 
Fiscal VARs disagree on the effects of increases in government spending on private 
consumption. Empirical models either find insignificant or weakly positive responses. All 
studies agree on the positive effect of fiscal expansion on output, however. The dynamic 
responses of the common trends model reverse some of these standard results. I find that 
an expansionary fiscal policy has contractionary effects on output (Figure 2a). There is a 
stark contraction in the first year after the shock. This response is not very persistent. 
Afterwards, output slightly expands in the second and third year but returns to a steady 
value afterwards. At the same time, a fiscal shock has a particularly pronounced and 
persistently negative effect on inflation. Inflation remains significantly below baseline till 
three years after the shock. Consequently, there is also a slight monetary contraction. This 
interest rate response is not very significant nor very persistent, however. 20  Fiscal 
expansions that stray away from sustainability seem to be mainly due to expansions in 
government spending. Tax cuts play a smaller role. The model does not give a key on how 
a future fiscal adjustment will be brought about. I find a very gradual return of spending to 
the baseline value. For taxes, the adjustment is much less persistent. But in contrast to the 
results in Bohn (1991), I do not find any significant reversal of spending or an increase in 
tax revenues to offset the rise in public debt. 
 
The results of the monetary part of the model is more in line with standard findings in the 
literature. A loosening of monetary policy leads to a moderate increase in output, and a 
stronger and rather persistent rise in inflation (Figure 2b). Monetary policy shocks do not 
trigger a direct response of fiscal variables. There is a small indirect impact, as the budget 
responds to the output effects of changes in monetary policy. This is the effect of two 
opposing forces. Interest rate cuts reduce the tax base for capital taxation; output growth 
instead translates into higher tax revenues. 
 
The comparison of dynamic responses to the economic shocks generally confirms to 
economic priors (Figures 2c-e). The business cycle shock temporarily raises output and 
growth dampens out after about two years. Interest rates react in accordance: monetary 
policy reacts in a non-accommodative way to growth. This causes an initial decline in 
inflation that gradually rises over the economic boom. Owing to automatic stabilisers, tax 
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revenues rise in step with the increase in output. A positive supply shock has permanent 
effects on output. As one might expect, it also exerts a temporary deflationary impact on 
the economy. The permanent supply shock also leads to a sustained rise in government 
spending. This is not the consequence of an increase in the available budget: higher 
potential growth does not imply higher tax revenues. We even observe an initial decline in 
tax intake in the first two years after the supply shock. The nominal shock has a persistent 
impact on inflation and interest rates, but no impact on real variables. These permanent 
effects are rather imprecisely estimated, however. 
 
The forecast error variance decomposition gives some additional insights in the common 
trends model (Figure 3). At short horizons, most of the variability in the various series is 
accounted for by the transitory components. In the short- to medium-term, aggregate 
demand shocks are the main source of output variability whilst both supply-side and 
nominal shocks are so in the long-term. This translates in a consequent important role for 
business cycle and supply side fluctuations in government revenues. This obviously owes 
much to automatic stabilisation. Aggregate demand shocks are also driving interest rates 
in the short-term, but the major part is accounted for by nominal factors. The latter also 
largely explain movements in inflation, even if the contribution of monetary policy is rather 
large at short horizons. Monetary policy shocks have a small role in explaining variability in 
interest rates or fiscal policy at very short-term horizons. Interest rates do play an 
increasing role in the variability of expenditure. This could be consistent with a stronger 
reaction to interest payments over time. As in most other studies, the contribution to output 
is negligible at all horizons. The same holds for fiscal policy: systematic fiscal policy is 
more important than discretionary shifts. Variability in government expenditure is largely 
explained by its own past behaviour. This is consistent with spending being a largely 
independent process, driven by factors exogenous to the model. Spending has only a 
minor role in the variability of other series, in particular government revenues. This is a 
rather disappointing result : consolidatory adjustment with fiscal instruments, as in Bohn 
(1991), seem to occur only on the spending side of the budget. There are of course other 
channels (higher inflation, higher potential growth) that could render the debt position 
sustainable. 
 
4.4. The Ricardian effects of fiscal policy 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 As in Favero and Giavazzi (2007), I find that interest rate responses are much more muted. 
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The contractionary effects of fiscal policy shocks detected here stand in stark contrast to 
most previous results in the fiscal VAR literature. Several approaches have been used to 
identify fiscal shocks. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) make assumptions about the sluggish 
reaction of some variables to fiscal policy and use detailed institutional information on the 
tax system. The main finding of their semi-structural VAR, which has been repeated by 
other authors for different samples, is the positive Keynesian effect of fiscal expansions on 
consumption, albeit the total mulitplier effect is small. Studies that make a detailed 
historical study of policy decisions (Romer, 1994; Romer and Romer, 2007) or use 
information on large fiscal events that may be assumed exogeneous (e.g. the timing of 
wars and defense spending)(Edelberg et al., 1998; Burnside et al., 2003) find small or 
insignificant positive effects of fiscal policy on consumption.21 Howver, all studies would 
agree that increased government spending or tax cuts have positive output effects in the 
short run. 
 
These results are in line with the predictions of baseline DSGE models of fiscal policy. The 
basic mechanism behind the expansion of output in RBC models is the wealth effect 
(Baxter and King, 1993). An increase in government spending implies higher (lump sum) 
taxes in the future. As a consequence, consumption and leisure are substituted for an 
increase in the labour supply. Models that extend the baseline neo-classical model with 
some nominal rigidities also find positive effects of output. The expansionary effect in 
these New Keynesian models basically owes to a shift in labour demand and an increase 
in the real wage that induces higher consumption, via a substitution effect or because of 
some fraction of agents that are credit constrained.22 What may explain the contractionary 
output response after fiscal expansions in the common trends model then? 
 
A first reason might be monetary policy. Responses of the central bank to changes in fiscal 
policy might reverse its usual crowding out effects. An aggressive anti-inflationary reaction 
of the central bank that raises interest rates in the wake of a fiscal shock could actually 
reverse the expansionary output effect. Linnemann and Schabert (2003) or Gali and 
Monacelli (2005) show in a New Keynesian model that the effects of fiscal policy can vary 
                                                 
21 Studies that impose ‘sign’ restrictions on fiscal VARs do not find significant responses either (Mountford and 
Uhlig, 2005). 
  
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2007                                     Working Papers 2007/15, 45 pages 
19
with the monetary regime. Moreover, strong changes in interest rates further burden the 
government with higher interest payments on outstanding debt.23 In fiscal VARs, monetary 
policy has been treated in a rather incomplete way. It is usually considered sufficient to 
include some price variables. By absorbing some of the effects of future fiscal policy 
changes, these augmented VARs reveal muted responses of macroeconomic variables to 
non-systematic fiscal shocks (the so-called ‘Sims conjecture’ (Perotti, 2005)).24 SVAR 
studies of this type find more moderate but still significantly positive output effects though. 
Mountford and Uhlig (2005) is the only study to explicitly identify both fiscal and monetary 
policy. They do not find significant output responses to fiscal shocks, but no contraction 
either. In my model, the short-term interest rate falls in the first quarters after the shock.25 
However, this fall is much smaller than the drop in inflation. We would have anticipated at 
least some accommodating reaction of the central bank. Hence, the fiscal shock implies 
some monetary contraction. It is not unlikely that the Federal Reserve sets its policy as a 
strategic substitute to expansionary budgets of the Treasury. Nonetheless, it seems 
unlikely that the slight contraction of monetary policy explains the large size of the output 
contraction. Hence, the monetary policy reaction is genuinely meant to dampen the 
adverse economic effects of the fiscal shock. We can discard the hypothesis that the 
monetary policy regime is the reason of the output contraction.26 
 
Not only do I condition on monetary policy, the empirical model also includes a technology 
shock with permanent output effects. Both RBC and New Keynesian models allow for 
cyclical fluctuations around some steady-state trending growth path. In RBC models, fiscal 
policy would only have the supply-side effect of boosting labour supply; New Keynesian 
models display additional transitory output devations due to nominal rigidities. 
Consequently, conditional on the supply shifts, there are either zero or positive output 
variations. I find that supply shocks cause government spending to permanently expand. 
Supply shocks do not lead to similar increases in tax revenues. Hence, revenue windfalls 
do not fuel a rise in spending. Hence, the common trends model picks up important supply 
                                                                                                                                                 
22 The real proof of the RBC or the (New) Keynesian model lies in the response of consumption, which goes in 
opposite directions. The large contraction in output must be due to a contraction in consumption, and hence 
contradicts both models. 
23 Favero and Giavazzi (2004) illustrate how interest rate hikes lead to a snowballing debt service. 
24 Moreover, the omission of interest rates may lead to aggregation of monetary and fiscal shocks if there are 
important systematic contemporaneous relationships between both policies. 
25 The interest rate falls in the first quarters after the fiscal shock in Mountford and Uhlig (2005). 
26 Note that the lack of a monetary response also excludes that the public expects monetary policy to resolve 
the fiscal problems. 
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side effects of government spending, which it mingles with ‘other’ technology shocks. This 
would still not explain the temporary contractionary response to the fiscal shock, however. 
 
The finding is consistent though with a specific RBC model of fiscal policy. If the 
government keeps the budget balance period-by-period, output declines if spending 
shocks are offset with proportionate increases in distortionary taxation. Tax hikes make 
agents smooth intertemporally, reducing temporarily both current labour supply and 
investment. As tax bases decline, the rise in tax rates needs to be more than proportional 
to cover the additional spending. Consequently, the contractionary effect of taxes more 
than offset the positive output effects of increased spending. 
The common trends model identifies exactly this type of fiscal shock: it is a temporary 
innovation to the budget constraint. In order to account for a negative output effect, 
taxation needs to be distortionary in the RBC model. In practice, distortionary taxation is 
definitely more common than lump sum taxation. The evidence can thus account for the 
features of a RBC model that is closer to reality.  
 
Gordon and Leeper (2005) suggest an additional explanation for the negative output effect. 
Policies that increase government indebtedness raise future debt obligations. To the 
extent that fiscal expansions are expected to be brought back by a mix of tax rises or 
spending cuts in the future, negative Ricardian effects may dominate in the short run. 
DSGE models that account for this expectational channel indeed find opposite effects of 
fiscal policy, in contrast to what standard RBC or New Keynesian models predict (Gordon 
and Leeper, 2005). Fiscal expansions have negative output effects by affecting 
intertemporal saving choices.27,28 Taking the government budget constraint seriously can 
overturn widely held beliefs on policy effects (Leeper and Nason, 2005). In contrast to 
other fiscal VARs, the common trends model indeed explicitly incorporates the 
intertemporal government budget constraint. The VAR-counterparts to DSGE-models 
usually ignore the dynamic adjustment of government spending and taxes after a fiscal 
shock that menaces debt sustainability. The means of financing and the adjustment in 
spending and taxes wrap the empirically relevant role of expectations effects in the fiscal 
policy shock, without considering the path of public debt. By ignoring the effects of the 
                                                 
27 Their simulations with US data demonstrate that such expectations are sufficient to create business cycle 
like variations in macroeconomic variables. 
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budget constraint, the responses to fiscal shocks are biased. The common trends model 
explicitly embodies expectations of changes in fiscal policy, and thereby incorporates the 
forward looking behaviour of economic agents. This makes us recover the typical 
‘Ricardian’ effect of fiscal expansions. 
 
4.5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
4.5.1. Data definitions 
 
The results are confirmed for other definitions of the fiscal series and output. Figures 4a-c 
display the results for the fiscal shock for some alternative specifications. One wonders if 
the protracted crowding out effect is not simply due to (national) accounting conventions. 
Figure 4a plots the response of total instead of private output. No significant difference 
results. I have excluded government investment from the budget as it might have 
long-term effects on output. Including public capital building does not affect the findings, 
however (Figure 4b). Finally, I use total capital transactions instead of including only net 
interest payments, but again the main result remains (Figure 4c). To sum up, alternative 
data definitions usually lead to more pronounced responses to fiscal shocks, but all 
confirm the contractionary effects following fiscal expansions. 
 
4.5.2. Model fit 
 
There are several other ways to assess the robustness of the results from the common 
trends model. Following (12), the common trends model provides us with a decomposition 
of the series into (time-varying) permanent and transitory components (Figure 5a-b). The 
permanent component can be directly compared to measures of potential output, 
cyclically adjusted government balances, core inflation and base real interest rates as 
calculated by international organisations, or as obtained by some mechanical data filters 
(Table 3). 
 
The underlying real and the nominal stochastic trends that I extract from the model do 
make sense. The permanent component gives a reasonable characterisation of the trends 
                                                                                                                                                 
28 There are some more elaborate models of fiscal policy that specify a role for debt also challenge the 
conventional view (Linnemann and Schabert, 2005). The identification of these theoretical models would 
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underlying the series. This is perhaps least clear for the fiscal series. Actual and 
permanent spending coincide only over the period 1972-1985, but afterwards transitory 
fluctuations outdo the permanent component. Similarly, actual revenues are constantly 
larger than permanent tax income. As the budget constraint needs to be satisfied 
in-sample, the unusual budgetary events after 2001 cause the permanent component to 
be shifted down. The dramatic decline in revenues in 2002 accordingly attributes a larger 
part of fiscal series to the transitory component. In addition, a large part of the transitory 
increase in revenues is also due to the positive output gap over the nineties. The 
corresponding permanent net lending ratio nevertheless tracks the (primary) net lending 
ratio quite well, and the correlation with the primary deficit – in ratios or levels – is positive 
and significant. 
 
The tendency for economic fluctuations to become less volatile and prolonged is clear 
from Figure 5b, and has also been documented elsewhere (Stock and Watson, 2003). The 
permanent output component tracks quite well other measures of potential output. The 
economic cycles correspond to periods of economic boom and bust. Both the permanent 
and transitory output series are correlated with measures provided by NIPA or a HP-filter. 
 
A similar tendency for transitory fluctuations to become more regular and prolonged is 
visible for interest rates. The actual series oscillates around the permanent interest rate, 
reflecting the gradual loosening and tightening of policy. The trend decline in interest rates 
is also rather well captured. Interestingly, the strong fiscal expansion in recent years 
seems to be accompanied by a positive jump in the real interest rate. Fiscal consolidation 
in the nineties has been as important as ‘good’ monetary policy in bringing down interest 
rates. In order to close the gap with the natural level of interest rates, the Federal Reserve 
will need to tighten monetary stance rather strongly. The model seems less successful in 
describing the behaviour of inflation. Permanent inflation is much lower than the actual 
series, and indicates deflation over the nineties. Nevertheless, the ‘Goldilocks’ US 
economic boom with steady economic growth and low inflation has often been attributed 
to persistenly positive supply shocks with possibly falling prices. There is no 
correspondence to more standard core measures of inflation. 
 
4.5.3. Analysing structural shocks 
                                                                                                                                                 
require a more detailed empirical structure, however. 
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Since the criticism of Rudebusch (1998), we know that inference on the structural shocks 
is a dubious exercise as the residual series we obtain may depend on the particular 
specification of the empirical model. It may be too much to require an exact timing or an 
appropriate size of policy shocks. Nevertheless, periods of strong deviations away from or 
towards solvency should be easily discernible. Figure 6 displays the structural fiscal policy 
shock from the base common trends model. Large outliers are exceptional but some 
periods appear more evident. The tax cut of 1975 and the Carter-Reagan expansion of the 
early eighties are visible. The Bush tax cut of 2001 is less evident. Note that the volatility of 
discretionary fiscal interventions on sustainability have declined since the eighties (around 
1985-1987) and have been at a low level since (Figure 7). This underlines the switch to a 
more consolidatory fiscal stance in the nineties. The recent rise announces another shift to 
a period of debt accumulation. 
 
4.5.4. Structural breaks: regime shifts in fiscal and monetary policy 
 
I first check for structural breaks in the joint DGP of Xt  (Table 4, Figure 8a-b). I follow Bai 
et al. (1998) in constructing a sequential Quandt-Andrews likelihood ratio test based for a 
VAR. The (single) breakdate is the supremum value of this recursively generated series 
over the central 70% of the sample. Following Stock and Watson (2003), I scale the series 
by the change in residual variance before and after the initially estimated breakdate.29 The 
confidence interval around this break indicates (Bai, 1997) how precise the structural 
break can be located. I set lag length of the VAR model to four, which should be sufficient 
for quarterly data. 
 
The tests indicate a quite precisely estimated structural break in the first half of the eighties. 
The break occurred between the first quarter of 1981 (for the homoskedastic version) and 
the third quarter of 1985 (for the heteroskedastic version). This probably reflects  
‘Volcker-Greenspan’ shift to an actively inflation combating Federal Reserve (Clarida et al., 
2000). Nevertheless, there is no reason to fancy a particular break date. A plot of the 
heteroskedatic test stats shows that instability is spread out over the entire eighties. A 
gradual decline only sets in after 1990, but never returns to its pre-1980 level. As this is 
                                                 
29 Applying this heteroskedasticity correction more correctly locates the break if the data series did not only 
change its first, but also its second moments. 
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reduced form evidence, I cannot tell apart the importance of shifts in either fiscal or 
monetary policy. A regime of ‘passive’ fiscal policy and ‘active’ monetary policy is crucial in 
bringing about stability. The strong reduction in public debt during the Clinton 
Administration follows upon a period in which the Federal Reserve kept inflation under 
control. Favero and Monacelli (2005) notice that fiscal policy aids in tracking inflation 
developments when the Treasury disregards debt consolidation. A debt stabilising regime 
started around 1987. 
 
To get some more insight in the break tests of the general unrestricted VAR, I subject the 
structural VEC model to some recursive stability tests The decomposition into the long and 
short-term parts of the common trends model tells us whether the equilibrium relations or 
the speed of dynamic adjustment have changed over time. I recursively add data to the 
base period 1965:1-1976:1 to update the estimates of the VEC model. I scale each 
statistic by the 90% quantile of the distribution in Figure 9a. The time path of the 
recursively estimated trace statistic should be upward sloping for the significant rank 
values, but downward for the non-significant ranks. Only at the beginning of the sample is 
there clear evidence of three cointegrating relations. There is a strong fall in the 
significance of the trace parameters around 1980, and at most two cointegration relations 
can be said to exist till at least the mid-nineties. 
 
As the hypothesis of constant rank is rejected, I continue to test for constancy of the 
cointegration parameters. I first concentrate out the short-term parameters α  from the 
likelihood function, and estimate only the long-term part of the VEC. The recursively 
estimated eigenvalues give a visual test of parameter constancy. The normalised 
non-zero eigenvalues are plotted together with their approximate 95% asymptotic error 
bounds. Figure 9b shows the time paths of the three non-zero eigenvalues. In line with the 
results of the rank test, all eigenvalues are significant in the first part of the sample. Most of 
the instability occurs in the late seventies (for the largest eigenvalue), and early eighties 
(for the second eigenvalue). Towards the end of the sample, we observe a gradual decline. 
A formal test of constancy of the eigenvalues is given by the fluctuation τ -test of Hansen 
and Johansen (1999).30 Only for the largest eigenvalue do I reject the stability-null (Figure 
9c). The non-constancy of the cointegrating vector occurs over the period 1981-1992. This 
                                                 
30 We plot the sample path of the eigenvalues together with the 5% critical value of its supremum value. The 
null hypothesis is stability of the eigenvalues of the VEC model, but does not consider a specific alternative. 
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again suggests the importance of the Volcker shift in monetary policy, in conjunction with a 
gradual turnaround of fiscal policy to control public debt. As the other eigenvalues are not 
rejected to be constant, the overall fluctuation τ -test on the sum of eigenvalues is also 
strongly in favour of parameter constancy (Figure 9d). 
 
I can only square this parameter constancy in β  with the finding of instability in the VAR 
model, by locating changes in the short-term adjustment part of the model. I run the overall 
?-test on all the parameters in ′αβ  as given by the VEC model. The recursive plot of 
fluctuation test statistics in Figure 9e indeed indicates instability in 
′αβ  over the first half 
of the sample up till 1980. Afterwards, a gradually decline sets in over time, confirming 
previous evidence of stability since around 1987 (except for a marginal rejection in 1995). 
I thus find that the long-term relations itself are stable, but that the persistence of the 
response to shocks underwent structural changes. 
 
4.5.5. Alternative specifications of the VEC model 
 
I now look in more detail into the role of public debt and interest payments and report 
selected results for some alternative specifications of the VEC model. So far, I did not use 
the theoretical cointegration relation between spending and revenues or the nominal 
interest rate and inflation. First, the data definitions for fiscal series do not completely 
match the theoretical concept. Second, we may expect debt to converge to some positive 
bounded value. The effect of imposing the cointegration vector ]1,1[ −=′β  on spending 
and revenues is to make the fiscal shock, and the consequent responses of output and 
inflation much more persistent relative to the base case (Figure 10a). An interest rate hike 
occurs over the first quarters. Again, there is no significant adjustment in revenues taking 
place. The decomposition in transitory and permanent components makes clear this is not 
a well fitting specification though (Figure 10b). 
 
Instead of deriving the evolution of public debt from the budget constraint, a direct control 
for the accumulation of fiscal imbalances over time might be more straightforward. Several 
possibilities are open. A first alternative is to control for the initial stock of debt, and impose 
it as an exogenous process on the VEC model. The cointegrating relation between total 
spending and revenues can alternatively be rephrased as holding between current 
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spending, total revenues and interest payments.31  Governments’ fiscal policies then 
satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint if the vector ]1,1,1[ −=′β . Reformulating this 
with respect to debt, gives the following cointegrating vector: ],1,1[ κβ −=′ , where κ  is 
now the coefficient on total public debt. I experiment also with imposing debt as an 
exogenous variable in the former case. 
 
Table 5 gathers the cointegration rank test for these different specifications. Only if debt is 
imposed exogenously I do not reject a cointegrating rank of three. In all other 
specifications, at most a rank of two can be accepted. I test the stability of these alternative 
VAR models, but these do not give contrary results to the basic model for the 
homoskedastic version (Table 6). Controlling for heteroskedasticity, the models with 
interest payments locate the break about 1990 instead. Despite the gradual decline in 
interest rates, the repayment of public debt probably gathered pace, explaining the 
accelerated rise in interest payments. 
 
The results for these models are rather disappointing: none of the impulse responses is 
really significant, nor does the common trends model fit the series well. This is clearly the 
case when debt is included as an exogenous variable. 
 
Additional identifying restrictions are necessary in case public debt or interest payments 
are made endogenous in a VAR[6]. I continue imposing the three cointegration relations. I 
accordingly need additional identifying restrictions. I do so by distinguishing a third 
common trend. As before, I retrieve a real trend from a supply shock with having 
permanent effects on output, and a nominal trend with permanent effects on prices. I 
consider shocks to the real interest rate as causing a third common trend underlying all 
variables. Neither of these common trends models gives a precise indication on the effects 
of fiscal policy. The decomposition of the model tracks in both cases the variables rather 
well, and gives transitory fluctuations around the permanent trends that make economic 
sense (Figure 11a-b). Only core inflation remains well below zero. In contrast to the base 
model, the specification with interest payments attributes most of the shocks in fiscal 
policy to the period of monetary turbulence around 1980. A plot of the standardised 
residuals for both specifications shows that shocks in other periods are much less 
                                                 
31 We include alternatively net payments on outstanding debt, and overall capital non-investment transactions 
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pronounced, with the exception of the increase in the Vietnam War spending around 1967, 
or the 1975 tax cut (Figure 12a-b). Most of the volatility in fiscal policy is accordingly 
located in the early eighties. This corroborates the interpretation of the discipline imposed 
by much tighter monetary policy on fiscal behaviour through rising interest payments, 
albeit with some lag in its implementation. This is also consistent with the other findings of 
a break in fiscal policy happening in the late eighties (Favero and Monacelli, 2005). 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on fiscal VARs. I proposes the common 
trends to shed some new light on the economic effects of fiscal policy, and resolve some of 
the empirical puzzles in fiscal VARs. The SVAR model embeds the long-term government 
budget constraint constraint in an analysis of short-term stabilisation policies. The error 
correction structure of the model permits analysing the short-term dynamics following 
shocks to the long-term equilibrium around some common trends, which are driven by 
shocks with permanent effects. The model is fully consistent with the theoretical properties 
of recent DSGE models of fiscal policy. 
 
In contrast to common results in the fiscal SVAR literature, I find expansionary fiscal policy 
to have contractionary effects on output and inflation in the short run. As we control for 
monetary policy, we can discard the hypothesis that a tough anti-inflationary stance of the 
central bank causes this effect. Supply-side effects of fiscal policy are not responsible 
either. The explanation for this ‘puzzle’ lies in the identification of fiscal policy. I consider as 
a fiscal shock the deviation from the government budget constraint. In RBC models, fiscal 
expansions have negative output effects when the government keeps budget balance 
period-by-period, but only if it uses distortionary taxes. Taking the government budget 
constraint seriously can overturn usual policy effects also in a second way. To the extent 
that fiscal expansions are expected to be brought back by future tax rises or spending cuts, 
negative Ricardian effects may dominate. DSGE models that account for this 
expectational channel indeed confirm opposite effects of fiscal policy, as to what standard 
RBC or New Keynesian models predict (Gordon and Leeper, 2005). 
 
The lesson we draw from this is that financing decisions of government policies matter, 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the budget. 
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and may even outdo the effect of the initial change in fiscal policy.32 RBC models may be 
less awkward than what recent extensions with nominal rigidities and other frictions seem 
to suggest. Attention should primarily focus on the friction of distortionarity taxation.  
The implication for empirical research with fiscal VARs is that considering both 
government spending and taxes pays off with a better insight in the properties of fiscal 
policy models. There is also an urgent need to better understand the effect of changes in 
taxation. The identification of changes in taxation is fraught with enormous dfifficulties, 
however. 
 
This paper provides a comprehensive framework to deal with both short- and long-term 
effects of economic policies. The common trends model of fiscal policy can be extended in 
at least two interesting directions. First, the analysis of consumption and investment 
responses to fiscal policy under a common trends identification may validate the 
importance of the expectation channel in RBC or New Keynesian models. Second, a 
recent literature combines the insights from finance and macroeconomic models to 
examine monetary policy (Rudebusch and Wu, 2003). A more elaborate specification of 
the interest rate structure, may allow for a feedback between the term structure factors 
and monetary or fiscal macro variables. 
                                                 
32 “ … [ ] The financing decisión is quantitatively more important than the resource cost of changes in 
government parchases.” (Baxter and King, 1993). 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Unit root tests.(a) 
 level first difference 
Test ADF(b) KPSS ADF
(b) KPSS 
 μ  τ  μ  τ  μ  τ  μ  τ  
government 
expenditure **-3.21 -2.41 ***3.50 ***0.66 ***-3.90 ***-4.86 ***1.33 *0.13 
government 
revenues -1.31 -2.44 ***3.35 0.11 ***-4.01 ***-4.09 0.12 0.06 
output -1.08 **-3.88 ***3.57 ***0.25 ***-4.30 ***-4.36 0.05 0.03 
inflation -2.04 -2.44 ***0.37 ***0.31 ***-4.15 ***-4.40 0.12 0.04 
interest rate **-2.91 -2.88 **0.57 ***0.57 ***-3.89 ***-4.13 0.19 0.03 
public debt -0.47 -2.00 ***3.59 ***0.43 -2.19 -2.18 **0.70 ***0.70 
net interest 
payments -1.91 1.56 ***3.40 ***0.59 -2.07 -2.91 ***1.26 ***0.56 
total interest 
payments -1.89 0.43 ***3.40 ***0.59 -0.61 -1.33 ***1.29 ***0.58 
Notes: (a) table entries are test statistics; */ **/ *** indicates the variable is I(1) at 10, 5 and 1% significance level 
respectively; the optimal lag order is determined by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), with a maximum of 
8 lags; (b) μ  for level stationarity, τ  for trend stationarity. 
Table 2. Trace tests for cointegration rank.(a) 
null hypothesis constant 5% critical value constant and trend 5% critical value 
 Trace test 
rank = 0 ***167.83 76.81 ***136.64 88.55 
rank ? 1 ***68.32 53.94 ***75.92 63.66 
rank ? 2 **38.08 35.07 *40.40 42.77 
rank ? 3 12.05 20.16 20.54 25.73 
rank ? 4 5.04 9.14 4.33 12.45 
 S&L Test
rank = 0 ***107.13 59.95 ***110.81 66.13 
rank ? 1 **43.19 40.07 ***58.53 45.32 
rank ? 2 13.32 24.16 15.52 28.52 
rank ? 3 9.30 12.26 2.08 15.76 
rank ? 4 - - 1.14 6.79 
Notes: (a) trace or S&L test statistics, critical values are from Doornik (1998) and Trenkler (2004). 
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Table 3. Correlation of permanent and transitory components with common measures. 
permanent component of output permanent component of inflation 
potential NIPA 0.92  (0.00) core inflation -0.29  (0.00) 
HP-filter 0.91  (0.00) HP filter -0.28  (0.00) 
cyclical component of output permanent primary deficit 
HP-filter 0.59  (0.00) level, HP filter 0.44  (0.00) 
linear trend 0.07  (0.87) ratio, NIPA 0.38  (0.00) 
quadratic trend 0.29  (0.00)   
Table 4. Stability tests: breakdate in VAR[Xt ], 4 lags, 1965:1-2003:4. 
 QLR-test stat(a) breakdate confidence interval 
homoskedastic 38.38  (0.00) 1982:2 [1981:1; 1983:3] 
heteroskedastic 50.24  (0.00) 1984:1 [1983:3; 1985:3] 
Notes: (a) the test statistic is the Quandt-Andrews LR version, with p-value in brackets. The breakdate is the 
heteroskedasticity corrected sup Quandt-Andrews breakdate (Stock and Watson, 2003). The years in brackets are the 
confidence interval at 33% (Bai, 1997); [ -; - ] indicates this interval exceeds the sample. 
Table 5. Trace tests for cointegration rank, constant in cointegration relation.(a) 
Null 
basic model + debt 
exogenous 
+ net interest 
payments 
+ total interest 
payments 
+ net interest 
payments + 
debt 
exogenous 
+ total interest 
payments + 
debt 
exogenous 
+ debt 
endogenous 
rank = 0 ***136.64 ***113.02 ***142.24 ***135.41 ***160.37 ***158.80 ***229.54 
rank ≤  1 ***75.92 **51.69 **77.83 **77.07 **86.31 **93.67 ***106.46 
rank ≤  2 *40.40 *31.63 44.66 44.62 48.85 48.07 50.66 
rank ≤  3 20.54 17.12 25.27 25.58 27.28 25.61 30.67 
rank ≤  4 4.33 6.67 12.52 12.36 14.86 13.99 16.26 
rank ≤  5 - - 4.37 4.69 5.76 5.81 5.82 
Notes: (a) entries are trace tests; */ **/ *** shows the 10, 5 and 1% significance level respectively. 
Table 6. Breakdate test on VAR, 4 lags, 1960:1-2003:4.(a) 
VAR QLR-test stat breakdate confidence interval 
Basic model 
homoskedastic 38.38  (0.00) 1982:2 [1981:1; 1983:3] 
heteroskedastic 50.24  (0.00) 1984:1 [1983:3; 1985:3] 
Basic model, with exogenous debt 
homoskedastic 40.61  (0.00) 1982:2 [1981:2; 1983:2] 
heteroskedastic 52.36  (0.00) 1984:1 [1983:3; 1985:3] 
Basic model, with net interest payments 
homoskedastic 43.46  (0.00) 1982:2 [1981:2; 1983:2] 
heteroskedastic 60.58  (0.00) 1990:4 [1990:2; 1992:2] 
Basic model, with exogenous debt and net interest payments 
homoskedastic 37.87  (0.00) 1982:2 [1981:1; 1983:3] 
heteroskedastic 50.07  (0.00) 1990:4 [1990:2; 1992:3] 
Notes: see table 4. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Data, United States, 1965:1-2003:4. 
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Figure 2a. Impulse response function, 66% asymptotic confidence interval, response to a 1 
standard deviation fiscal policy shock. 
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Figure 2b. Impulse response function, 66% asymptotic confidence interval, response to a 1 
standard deviation monetary policy shock. 
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Figure 2c. Impulse response function, 66% asymptotic confidence interval, response to a 1 
standard deviation business cycle shock. 
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Figure 2d. Impulse response function, 66% asymptotic confidence interval, response to a 1 
standard deviation real supply shock. 
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Figure 2e. Impulse response function, 66% asymptotic confidence interval, response to a 1 
standard deviation nominal shock. 
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Figure 3. Forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD). 
expenditure
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
output
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
interest rates
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
 
revenues
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
inflation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
 
■ real ■ nominal ■ fiscal ■ monetary ■ business cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2007                                     Working Papers 2007/15, 45 pages 
37
Figure 4a. Impulse response function, response to a 1 standard deviation fiscal shock. 
 
Figure 4b. Impulse response function, response to a 1 standard deviation fiscal shock, 
government expenditure = consumption + government investment + net interest payments. 
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Figure 4c. Impulse response function, response to a 1 standard deviation fiscal shock, 
government expenditure = consumption + total interest payments. 
 
 
Figure 5a. Series and permanent component, from (12). 
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Figure 5b. Series and transitory component, from (12). 
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Figure 6. Fiscal policy shocks, standardised residual, from (13). 
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Figure 7. Volatility of fiscal policy shock, rolling window of 20 quarters. 
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Figure 8a. Stability analysis for VAR – breakdate estimation (homoskedastic version). 
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Figure 8b. Stability analysis for VAR – breakdate estimation (heteroskedastic version). 
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Figure 9a. Stability test - Recursive trace test for rank (Hansen and Johansen, 1999).(a) 
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Note: (a) scaled critical values: 1 is the significance level at 5%. 
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Figure 9b. Stability analysis on VEC – recursive eigenvalues. 
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Figure 9c. Stability analysis– ?-test on stability eigenvalues (Hansen and Johansen, 1999). 
 
Figure 9d. Stability analysis – ?-test on sum eigenvalues (Hansen and Johansen, 1999). 
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Figure 9e. Stability analysis – ?-test on sum eigenvalues (Hansen and Johansen, 1999). 
 
Figure 10a. Impulse response function, 66% asymptotic confidence interval, response to a 
1 standard deviation fiscal policy shock, theoretical cointegration vectors. 
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Figure 10b. Series and permanent component: theoretical cointegration vectors. 
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Figure 11a. Series and permanent component: interest payments in cointegration relation. 
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 series   permanent component 
Figure 11b. Series and permanent component: debt in cointegration relation. 
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Figure 12a. Fiscal policy shocks, standardised residual: interest payments in cointegration 
relation. 
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Figure 12b. Fiscal policy shocks, standardised residual: debt in cointegration relation. 
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